

traffic, if it received no aid of any kind from West, and if its free world market for long staple cotton could be denied it. Sir Roger said he thought this was a good idea, and in this connection the International Bank had a mass of economic material on Egypt which might be useful. The Secretary . . . reiterated that he thought the present struggle going on in the Middle East to prevent Soviet penetration would be won by political, economic, and counter-subversive actions rather than by military actions.

Dickson mentioned again that the Israeli army was out-gunned by the Egyptian army, but for the period of the next six months he believed the Israeli army could defeat the Egyptians in the field. He thought it was a good thing the French were sending some Mysteres and that Canada also might send some planes since it would be a great temptation to the Egyptians if the Israeli level of defense were not somewhat increased. At the same time, he felt that both the US and the UK should not send military equipment to the Israelis as this would impair their position and influence with the Arab states. Dickson mentioned that for a while the British had opposed the French sending Mysteres to Israel as they feared that if hostilities broke out the UK would have to honor its commitment with Jordan, and might be fighting against Israel with Jordanian aircraft which were inferior to the Mysteres. In the light of the recent Jordan action, however, it was extremely doubtful that the UK would become involved on the side of Jordan in a conflict with Israel.

In response to a direct question by the Secretary, A.C.M. Dickson confirmed that the Indians were buying aircraft from the UK, but he said the UK was not sure whether the Indians might also purchase some aircraft and other military equipment from the Soviets.

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#### 241. Editorial Note

Acting in his capacity as Coordinator of the Omega program, Douglas MacArthur II divided into two parts the task of implementing the special Middle East policy contemplated in Document 222 and approved by the President on March 28 (see Document 223).

Fraser Wilkins assumed responsibility for the daily execution and implementation of those aspects of the program that the President had already accepted. Francis Russell took on the task of planning the implementation of additional measures.